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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
a National Association,
Plaintiff and

Respondent.

vs.
M S COMMODITIES, INC; M S COMMODITIES
OF UTAH, INC.; PRISCILLA SECREST;
MAURIE SCHNEIDER; J. MORONI STOOF;
EDWARD DALLIN BAGLEY; DAL-RON
ENTERPRISES, a corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
a National Association,
Third Party Plaintiff and

Case No.
13669

Respondent.

vs.
CLARK TANK LINES COMPANY,
a corporation,
Third Party Defendant and

Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the plaintiff and third party
plaintiff-respondent, Zions First National Bank ("Zions")
for recovery against the defendant-respondents on an
overdrawn account and on signatures, endorsements and
warranties on two returned checks. Defendant-respondent, M-S Commodities, Inc. ("M-S") asserted a coun-
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terclaim on a wire transfer of $25,000 by it to Zions, claiming that Zions had failed to disburse said funds in accordance with instructions given to it by M-S. Zions
joined third-party defendant-appellant, Clark Tank Lines
Company ("Clark") on a third party complaint alleging
that Clark had wrongfully diverted the proceeds of the
said wire transfer to its own use.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After a five-day trial of the case beginning October
15,1973, the District Court of the Third Judicial District,
Salt Lake County, entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Judgment on Januarry 17, 1974,
awarding Zions' judgment against M-S in the sum of
$38,505.08 (plus interest and costs) on the overdrawn
account. In addition, the court awarded Zions personal
judgments against Maurie Sohnedder ("Schneider") and
J. Moroni Stoof ("Stoof") in the amount of the overdraft ($38,505.08, plus interest and costs) for having
caused the overdraft by, in Schneider's case, wrongfully
transferring $75,000 out of the M-S account at Zions and,
in Stoof s case, by having deposited two bad checks to
the said account against which Zions extended credit in
transferring the $75,000. The court also awarded Zions
judgment against Dai-Ron Enterprises, Inc. in the sum
of $34,725.50 (plus interest and costs) on one of the returned checks. The trial court further awarded M-S
judgment on its counterclaim against Zions in the sum
of $25,000 (plus interest and costs) and in favor of Zions
on its third party complaint against Clark in the same
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amount. The court dismissed Zions' claims against Priscilla Secrest, Edward Dailin Bagley and M-S Commodities,^ Inc. of Utah.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Third party defendant-appellant, Clark seeks reveirsal
of that part of the judgment of the lower court awarding
M-S judgment on its counterclaim against Zions and
awarding Zions judgment on its third part complaint
against Clark.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant is a Utah corporation and a licensed interstate carrier of certain commodities.
Defendant-Respondent M-S is an Illinois corporation which operated a commodities futures brokerage business having its principal office in Chicago, Illinois. It
also maintained branch offices in other cities including,
from approximately November, 1970 through early 1972,
Salt Lake City. It is no longer doing business. (R. 649,
818, 1084; A. 7-8, 55, 233.) 1
At all times pertinent herein, defendant-respondent
Maurie Schneider was President, a director and principal
stockholder of M-S. He had been a commodity futures
broker for 22 years. (R. 851; A. 13.)
At all times pertinent herein, defendant-respondent
x

The letters "R" and "A" refer to the Record in Appeal and the
Abstract, respectively.
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J. Moroni Stoof was an agent of and a solicitor for M-S
at its Salt Lake City office and served as the office manager of said office from the time it was opened in November, 1970. (R. 570, 649, 1084, 1131; A. 55, 88, 217,
233.) He was "in charge" of the Salt Lake office (R.
838, A. 12), having authority, inter alia, to hire and fire
employees and salesmen, to arrange advertising and to
lease space and equipment for the business. (R. 898-99;
A. 25-27.)2 In addition, Stoof was at all pertinent times
President, a director and stockholder of Dai-Ron Enterprises ("Dai-Ron"). (R. 571, 649, 1086; A. 58, 218, 233.)
Prior to the opening of the local M-S office Stoof had
been employed by Clark Tank Lines as its controller and
he continued to work for Clark Tank Lines on a parttime basis after becoming an agent for M-S in November,
1970, until about March 16,1971. (R. 803, 1130; A. 7, 88).
Bagley also was at all pertinent times a solicitor for
and agent of M-S at its Salt Lake City office. (R. 649,
904-08, 1033; A. 30-33, 45, 233.) Operating under DalRon, a now defunct Utah corporation, organized by them
in the fall of 1970, he and Stoof acted as commodity brokers for various customers trading in commodities futures
contracts through said office as well as trading for their
own account. (R. 1033, 1085-86; A. 45, 57-58.) Stoof,
2
The Trial Court found that Stoof was co-manager of the Salt
Lake office with Edward Dallin Bagley ("Bagley"). (R649) Bagley
testified that he discussed this possibility with M-S but declined to
accept it. (R. 1033, A. 44) In any event, Stoof was recognized by employees in the office as the person "in charge." (R. 838, A. 12)
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5
Bagley and their wives were the only directors and stockholders of Dai-Ron. (R. 1171; A. 100.)
Dai-Ron maintained a checking account at the South
Davis Security Bank on which Stoof and Bagley were
authorized co-signatories. (Exh. 24-P; A. 209.) Although
the signature card for this account specified that both
signatures were required, both Stoof and Bagley had, in
fact, drawn checks on the account by their individual
signature which were honored by the drawee bank and
their business relationship was such that they "didn't
worry about" having two signatures on Dai-Ron checks,
(R 1093; A. 61.) Stoof and Bagley also cashed checks
made payable to Dai-Ron upon their individual, single,
endorsement. (R. 1113; A. 78.)
In connection with the operation of its Salt Lake
office, M-S maintained several bank accounts with Zions,
including the "M-S Commodities, Inc. Customers Segregated Fund Account" ("Segregated Fund Account"),
with which this appeal is concerned. (R. 569, 755-76;
Exh. 4-P; A. 2, 204-05, 217.) This was a depository account for funds of the customers of M-S's Salt Lake City
office. The funds of each customer were maintained
separate and apart within the account from funds of
other customers in accordance with the Commodity Exchange Act, 42 Stat. 998, 49 Stat. 1491, 7 U. S. C. §§1-17.
All monies in the account were customer funds and were
not funds of M-S Commodities. (R. 754, Exh. 2-P; A. 1,
203.) Stoof was authorized to endorse checks for deposit
into the Segregated Fund Account, but no checks could
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be drawn against the funds in the account. (R. 570, 794;
A. 61, 217.) Funds deposited in the account were transferred between Zions and a similar customers segregated
fund account maintained by M-S at the Harris Trust and
Savings Bank in Chicago, Illinois ("Harris Trust").
Maurie Schneider and Priscilla Secrest (Vice President
of M-S) and other M-S employees in Chicago were authorized to withdraw and transfer funds from and between these two accounts. (R. 650-51, 988-89; A. 42-43,
234-35.) In addition, Stoof and Bagley were authorized
to request the M-S Chicago office to transfer funds from
Harris Trust to Zions for account customers. (R. 909;
A. 34.)
The events with which this appeal is concerned occurred principally on Monday, March 15, 1971. On the
morning of that day, Stoof endorsed and deposited into
thes Segregated Fund Account for Dai-Ron a check for
$34, 725.50 payable to M-S drawn on insufficient funds
by him alone as President of Dai-Ron on the Dai-Ron
account at South Davis Security Bank. (R. 651, 1092;
A. 60, 235.) Later the same morning Stoof telephoned
Schneider in Chicago and requested that $25,000 be
transferred to Zions from the segregated fund account
of Dai-Ron Enterprises at Harris Trust. Stoof told
Schneider that $34,,725.50 had been deposited into the
Segregated Fund Account for Dai-Ron that morning
which, together with Dai-Ron funds already on hand
at Harris Trust and sales commissions due from M-S to
Stoof, would provide ample funds for the transfer, even
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after deducting $9,000 for a margin call on the Dai-Ron
account that morning. (R. 854-57, 110-11; A. 13-16, 7576.) During the same morning, Betty Lou Curtis, Stoof's
secretary at the Salt Lake M-S office, also called the
M-S Chicago office several times requesting that the
$25,000 be transferred to Zions. (R. 1279-80, 1282; A.
147-48, 150-51.) After seeing a wire photo of the deposit
slip, Schneider directed the M-S bookkeeper, Bruce
Bochner, to transfer the funds from the Dai-Ron account
at Harris Trust in Chicago to Zions. (R. 653, 857; A.
16-17, 237.) This transfer was effected by means of an
Advice of Credit from Harris Trust to Zions in the sum
of $25,000, bearing the notation "for credit of Dai-Ron
Enterprises." (Exh. 54-DMS; A. 214.)
The Trial Court found that Schneider transferred
the funds at Stoof's request for him to use to buy out
Bagley's stock and interest in Dai-Ron, that the $25,000
transfer represented the difference between the $9,000
margin call on the Dai-Ron account and the $34,725.50
Dai-Ron check deposited earlier in the morning of March
15th, that Stoof made the deposit intending to try to get
the $25,000 sent back to him to use for his own purpose
and that the $25,000 was a return to Dai-Ron of funds
deposited on behalf of Dai-Ron. (R. 652-53; A. 236-37.)
Of particular significance to this appeal is the trial court's
further finding that the $25,000 so transferred on March
15, 1971, did not belong to Stoof personally, but were
funds which belonged to Dai-Ron. (R. 653, 658; A. 237,
242.)
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On March 15, 1971, none of the officers or employees
of Clark Tank Lines (except Stoof) knew that Stoof had
been embezzling funds from Clark. (R. 807, 1116-18,
1127-28, 1177, 1305; A. 7, 79-80, 86, 104.)3 On that day,
however, Craig Maddux, a Clark employee, knew that
Stoof owed Clark $50,000, which Stoof had obtained from
Clark about a week before.4 Maddux's actions on March
15, 1971, were directed toward obtaining payment of this
obligation. (R. 1293-94, 1338-39; A. 160, 192.)
Around 10:00 a.m. on the morning of March 15,1971,
Stoof telephoned Maddux and told him he had $25,000
3
This fact was first revealed to Clark's President, Boyce R. Clark,
On March 17, 1971, following Stoof s confession to his church leaders
on the evening of March 16, 1971. (R. 1115-18; A. 79-80)
4
The details of this transaction, which is only pertinent to this
case to show Clark's bona fide right to receive the $25,000 on March
15, 1971, are as follows: On or about March 8, 1971, Stoof had obtained $50,000 of Clark funds by representing to Maddux, Clark's office manager, who had worked under Stoofs supervision both before
and after Stoof became M-S's local office manager (R. 1131, 1174,
1299-1300; A. 89, 102-03, 166) that he (Stoof) was going to make a
temporary personal loan of $50,000 to Clark to use in paying a Clark
indebtedness in that amount owed to American National Bank. He
told Maddux he would take his personal check for $50,000 to American National and instructed Maddux to issue to him a Clark check
in the same amount which he would hold for several days until Clark
had funds to cover it. Several days later, on or about March 10th, he
informed Maddux that the American National Bank had refused to
accept his personal check in payment for the Clark obligation and
instructed Maddux to purchase for Clark a $50,000 cashier's check
from Walker Bank and take it to American National, which Maddux
did. During the conversation, Stoof told Maddux he would come to
Clark later the same day and return the $50,000 previously given to
him, which he failed to do. Between March 10th and March 15th,
Stoof telephoned Maddux several times and told him he would be in
to re-pay the $50,000, each time failing to do so. (R. 1289-92; A 15760)
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coming from Chicago which would repay half of the
$50,000 indebtedness. Stoof instructed Maddux to go to
Zions and pick up a cashier's check made payable to
Clearfield State Bank and to deposit it to the Clark Tank
Lines account at that bank, this being the normal way
transfears of funds were handled between Clark's bank accounts. (R. 1294; A. 161.)
Either before or just after talking to Maddux, Stoof
telephoned Zions and spoke to Karen Christensen, a bank
employee assigned to its wixe transfer desk. (R. 1124,
1172-73, 1195-96; A. 83, 101, 115.) Christensen had met
Stoof previously and knew he was the Salt Lake representative for M-S and was also connected with the DalRon account. She recognized his voice. (R. 653, 1196,
1203-04; A. 115, 122-23, 237.) Stoof instructed her that
the funds coming from Chicago were to be disbursed in
the form of a cashier's check made payable to Clearfield
State Bank and authorized her to deliver this check to
Maddux. (R. 653, 1125, 1137-38, 1156, 1196; A. 83-84,
93-94, 96, 115, 237.) During the same morning, Christensen also spoke by telephone with Stoof's secretary at
the M-S office, Betty Lou Curtis, who also informed
Christensen that the check representing the funds was
to be made payable to Clearfield State Bank. (R. 1125,
1279-80; A. 83, 148.)
Maddux arrived at Zions approximately 15 to 30
minutes after receiving Stoof's telephone call (R. 1324;
A. 184), went to the bank's wire transfer desk and told
them he had been sent by Stoof to pick up the funds.
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After being informed that the funds had not yet arrived
he stated that he was going to talk to Stoof and left.
(R. 1200, 1318-19; A. 119, 178-79.) Maddux then went
to the M-S Commodities Salt Lake office where he
waited during the noon hour until word was received
from Zions that the funds had arrived. (R. 1295-96; A.
162-63.) While he was waiting at the M-S office, a telephone call from the Zioos wire transfer desk was received
by Stoofs secretary, Betty Lou Curtis, inquiring about
the identity of the person who had stopped at the bank
to pick up the funds. Curtis informed the person calling
that it was "Craig Maddux," identifying him as an employee of Clark Tank Lines,5 and then passed the tele5

The testimony is somewhat conflicting concerning how Maddux
was identified to Christensen and the Trial Court made no factual
finding on the matter. Christensen claimed that she never knew Maddux was a Clark Tank Lines employee and he was not identified to
her as such. ( R 1198, 1202; A,. 117-18, 121) She stated that Stoof
told her a representative of Clearfield State Bank would pick up the
check (R. 1198-99; A. 118) and that when Maddux first arrived at
her desk he told her he had "come down from Clearfield" to pick
up the funds. (R. 1199; A. 119) She also said that during Maddux's
first or return visit she asked him to provide identification from
Clearfield State Bank which he did not do, giving her his driver's
license verifying that he was Craig Maddux. (R. 1197; A. 116-17) She
specifically admitted that Maddux did not tell her he was from Clearfield State Bank. (R. 1197-98; A. 117) Stoof testified that he told
Christensen the funds would be picked up by a representative of
Clark Tank Lines and that he believed he gave her Maddux's name.
(R. 1124, 1137-38; A. 83-84, 93-94) Betty Curtis testified that in her
telephone conversation with Christensen around noon on March 15th,
while Maddux was in the M-S office she told Christensen that the
man Christensen had described to her was Craig Maddux and that
he was employed at Clark Tank Lines. (R. 1280-81; A. 149) Maddux
denied telling Christensen he was from Clearfield at any time and
stated that Christensen's only request to him was that he identify
himself as Craig Maddux, which he did by producing his driver's
license. (R. 1297, 1319; A. 164, 179). He testified that Christensen
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phone to Stoof who handled the call from thereon. (R.
1281-82; A. 149-51.)
Maddux returned to Zions at about 1:00 p.m. to
pick up the funds which had arrived from Harris Trust
under an Advice of Credit bearing the notation "For
Credit of Dai-Ron En*erpirise3w. (R. 1200, 1296j> Exh. 54DMS; A. 119, 163, 214.) Christensen prepared Cashier's
Check No. L24055 for $25,000 payable to Clearfield State
Bank (Exhibit 52-DMS; A. 212) and gave it to Maddux,
attached to which was a stub bearing the notation:
Funds wired for the Dai-Ron Enterprizes [sic]
March 15, 1971 $25,000 kc Mar transfer from
Hariris Trust in Chicago.
(R. 1201-02, 1297-98; Exh. 53-DMS; A. 120-121, 164-65,
213.) While she was making up the check, Maddux repeated the instruction that it be payable to Clearfield
State Bank. (R. 1195, 1296; A. 115, 163.) Maddux then
took the check to Clearfield State Bank and deposited
it, along with other funds, to Clark's account at that
bank. (R. 1294-95; A. 161-162.) Prior to making that
deposit, Maddux read the notation on the stub attached
to the check, but assumed it was merely a bank notation concerning the source of the funds, (R. 1298, 1322;
A. 165,182.) The check was endorsed by Clearfield State
Bank over to Clark and credited to the Clark account.
was preparing the check at the time of his return visit and that she
asked him for the name of the payee, to which he replied "Clearfield
State Bank", this being his only reference to that bank. (R. 1296,
1320; A. 163, 180-81)
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Clearfield had never claimed any right to or interest in
the check or its proceeds, (R. 1294-95; Exh. 52-DMS;
A. 162, 212.)
Subsequent events occurring during the period March
16 through March 18, 1971 resulted in the confession by
Stoof of his embezzlements from Clark, the visit of
Maurie Schneider to Salt Lake City for the purpose of
closing out commodity trading accounts of customers of
the local M-S office and Schneider's transfer of $75,000
to Chicago out of the Segregated Fund Account on March
18, 1971, which, when two checks previously drawn and
deposited therein by Stoof6 were returned unpaid, resulted in that account becoming overdrawn in the sum
of $38,505.08. Zions filed suit in this action to recover on
this overdraft. The trial court found that Schneider had
wrongfully arranged the $75,000 transfer knowing or having reason to know that the $34,725.50 check was no good
and that there would be insufficient funds to cover the
transfer. (R. 657, 659; A. 241, 243) Accordingly, the trial
court entered judgment in favor of Zions against Schneider personally for the amount of the overdraft along with
judgments in the same amount against M-S and Stoof.
These judgments are not challenged by this appeal.
Following the trial, Clark filed its Alternative Motions for a New Trial or to Amend Findings and Conclusions or to Alter and Amend Judgment. (R. 664; A. 248)
6
The aforementioned Dai-Ron check for $34,725.50 and a check
for $20,000 drawn by Stoof on his personal account at Clearfield State
Bank.
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After the entry in the minutes of the Trial Court's Order
denying a new trial and the Motion to Alter and Amend
Judgment,7 Clark timely filed its Notice of Appeal8 appealing to this Court from the portions of the trial court's
judgment reading as follows:
1. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that defendant
M-S Commodities, Inc. is awarded judgment on
its counterclaim against plaintiff Zions First National Bank in the amount of $25,000.00, plus interest and costs.
2. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that third party
plaintiff, Zions First National Bank,, is awarded
judgment against third party defendant Clark
Tank Lines in the amount of $25,000.00 plus interest and costs.
ARGUMENT
A. Appeal from Judgment of Trial Court Awarding MS Commodities Judgment on its Counterclaim Against Zions in the Sum of
$25,000
At the close of M-S's evidence on its counterclaim
Zions and Clark Tank Lines moved for dismissal thereof
for insufficiency of proof, including M-S's failure to prove
damages or its standing to maintain the counterclaim.
(R. 1263; A. 141) These Motions were taken under ad7

The Trial Court granted, in part, Clark's Motion to Amend
Findings and Conclusions.
8R. 701-03; A. 251-53.
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visement and the Trial Court subsequently entered judgment for M-S on the counterclaim for $25,000 based upon
its conclusion, that:
Plaintiff Zioms First National Bank was negligent in releasing the $25,000 wire transfer of
March 15, 1971, which had been sent for the
credit of Dai-Ron Enterprises to representatives
of Clark Tank Lines, by check made payable to
the Clearfield State Bank, and M-S Commodities is entitled to a judgment of $25,000 as an
offset to its liability to Zions First National Bank.
R. 659-60; A. 243-44) [Emphasis supplied.]
The sole basis asserted by M-S Commodities for recovery on its counterclaim was that it had transferred the
$25,000 for the "credit" of Dai-Ron and Zions had failed
to follow this instruction in releasing the funds to Craig
Maddux. During the trial, M-S expressly withdrew any
claim on its counterclaim based upon fraud.
MR. MESERVY:
*

*

*

In the circumstances, I feel that goes to my question of the fraud angle of my counterclaim; that
is, that the $25,000 was obtained by fraud and
therefore with no title passed. I feel at this point
I am unable to prove that and it would probably
shorten the trial if I conceded that point and
proceeded on my counterclaim only on the basis
of the strict liability of the bank as our agent and
having received these funds and failed to disburse
them per our instruction and we are entitled to
have them back from the bank. (R. 1242; A. 133)
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To sustain this claim, M^S was required to prove each
of the following elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) a specific instruction from it to Zions; (2)
failure by Zions to use the applicable standard of care
in carrying out such instruction; (3) damage to M-S
proximately caused by such failure by Zions.
Appellant submits, for the reasons set forth in the
following Points I through VI, that the Trial Court erred
in its above-quoted Conclusion of Law and in awarding
M-S judgment on its counterclaim on the basis for recovery asserted by it, or on any basis, on the grounds
that such judgment is unsupported by the evidence and
is contrary to the Trial Court's findings, the evidence and
the law. Inasmuch as recovery by M-S on its counterclaim was and is a condition precedent to Zions' recovery
on its Third Party Complaint against Appellant Clark,
reversal of the judgment on the counterclaim would automatically require reversal of the Third Party judgment
without any need for considering the merits of that action.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTIONS FOR A NEW
TRIAL OR TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT AND IN AWARDING JUDGMENT
TO M-S COMMODITIES ON ITS COUNTERCLAIM BECAUSE THE $25,000 WERE
FUNDS BELONGING TO DAL-RON ENTERPRISES AND M-S COMMODITIES HAD
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NO INTEREST THEREIN, SUFFERED NO
DAMAGE WITH RESPECT THERETO AND
HAD NO STANDING TO MAINTAIN THE
COUNTERCLAIM.
The Trial Court's judgment awards M-S damages for
the "loss" of funds which the Trial Court expressly found
belonged to Dai-Ron Enterprises. This factual finding is
fully supported by the record and the only conclusion to
be drawn therefrom is that M-S suffered no loss or damage with respect to the $25^000 transfer and, indeed, had
no standing to maintain its counterclaim. Consequently,
the Trial Court erred in awarding judgment to M-S on the
counterclaim.
In its summary of the evidence made at the trial immediately after final arguments, the Trial Court clearly stated that the funds belonged to Dai-Ron:
Now, as I see it, that $25,000 is a return of
$25,000 of the $34,000 included in that check
which Stoof told Schneider he had deposited to
the M-S account in Salt Lake City that day. They
were deposited as funds from Dai-Ron Enterprises. They were Dai-Ron Funds. They were not
Stoof's personal funds. . . .
*

*

*

What was done, was done with Dai-Ron Enterprises money and not with Stoofs money. (R.
1341; A. 194-95) [Emphasis supplied.]
This factual finding was reiterated by the Trial Court
in Paragraphs 24 and 41 of its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law as follows:
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24. The $25,000 wire transfer on March 15,1971,
did not belong to J. Moroni Stoof personally, but were funds which belonged to Dai-Ron
Enterprises, Inc. (R. 653; A. 237) [Emphasis
supplied.]
41. Representatives of Zions First National Bank
atoted negligently in releasing a cashier's
check for $25^000 payable to Clearfield State
Bank to Craig Maddux at the request and
instructions of J. Moroni Stoof and Craig
Maddux. The said check was based upon a
wire transfer request from M-S Commodities
"for the Dai-Ron Enterprises", and a release
of those funds payable other than to DalRon Enterprises at the mere direction of J.
Moroni Stoof and Craig Maddux constituted
negligence on the part of the bank. The
funds belonged to Dai-Ron Enterprises. (R.
658; A. 242) [Emphasis supplied.]
This finding is fully justified and amply supported by
the evidence. First, all parties conceded that the $25,000
transferred was debited to "Dai-Ron Customer Account
No. 40041," this being Dai-Ron's customer account in the
M-S Customers segregated fund account at Harris Trust
in Chicago. (See Paragraph 3n of the Pre-Trial Order,
R. 571; A. 217-18)
Second, M-S admitted that the segregated fund accounts in Chicago and in Salt Lake City were, in effect,
one account containing only customers' funds. Priscilla
Secrest testified:
Q. All right, lest we fall into the trap of thinking there is a conflict here, what is tihe differ-
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ence between the Segregated Fund Account in
Utah and Zions, and the Segregated Fund Account in Harris Bank in Chicago?
A. There is really no difference between the two.
They are only located in two different banks.
Q. All right, they are part of the same overall
accounting system?
A. They are all customer segregated funds of
M-S Commodities no matter where they are
located. (R. 989; A. 43)
It was always understood that the funds in the segregated fund account belonged to M-S's customers and not
to M-S. In its letter of September 21(, 1970, sent to Zions
for the purpose of establishing the segregated fund account at that bank, M-S stated:
Please acknowledge, by signing and returning to us the enclosed copy of this letter, that you
have been informed that the funds from time to
time deposited in the aforesaid account are those
of our commodity customers and are being held
in accordance with the provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act. (Exh. 2-P; A. 203) [Emphasis
supplied.]
The Commodities Exchange Act, 42 Stat. 998, 49
Stat. 1491, 7 U. S. C. §§ 1-17, pursuant to which the segregated fund accounts were maintained at Zions and Harris
Trust, specifically provides that funds in the account are
customers' funds which do not belong to the commodities
commission merchant (i.e., M-S Commodities) or any
other person and that it is unlawful for the commodities
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commission merchant to hold, dispose of or use them as its
own property.9
Thus, the debiting of Dai-Ron's Customer Account
No. 40041 at Harris Trust for the purposes of transferring
the $25,000 to Zions could only have involved Dai-Ron's
funds, as expressly found by the Trial Court. There is
clearly a resonable basis in the record to sustain this
factual finding.10 What cannot be sustained, however, is
the Trial Court's judgment, in the face of such finding,
awarding M-S damages on its counterclaim for the loss
of Dai-Ron's money. M-S did not allege, and there is no
evidence even suggesting that it had reimbursed or was
obligated to reimburse Dai-Ron for the $25,000 and was
therefore the assignee of or subrogated to Dai-Ron's,
claim.
Appellant has had and continues to have exttfame
difficulty in perceiving any basis upon which the Trial
9
[S]uch person [i.e., registered commodities commission merchant] shall, whether a member or non-member of a contract market,
treat and deal with all money, securities, and property received by
such person to margin, guarantee, or secure the trades or contracts
of any customer of such person or accruing to such customer as the
result of such trades or contracts, as belonging to such customer.
* * *
It shall be unlawful for any person, including . . . any depository,
that has received any money, securities, or property for deposit
in a separate account . . . to hold, dispose of, or use any such money,
securities or property as belonging to the depositing futures commission merchant. . . . 7 U.S.C. § 6d(2) (Supp.) [Emphasis supplied.]
10
The Trial Court's factual findings are presumed to be correct
unless the evidence clearly shows otherwise. DeWitt Distributors, Inc.
v. Bond Furniture, Inc., Sup. Ct., No. 13625 (Utah, Oct. 21, 1974);
Buchanan v. Crites, 106 Utah 428 150 P.2d 100 (1944).
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Court could award judgment to M-S in face of its determination that the funds belonged to Dai-Ron. In its Findings, the Trial Court stated that the $25,000 transfer was
intended by Stoof "to be nothing more than a return to
Dai-Ron of $25 [thousand] of the $34,000 deposited in the
M-S account that morning on behalf of Dai-Ron" and that
Stoof deposited the check with the intent of getting the
$25,000 back from M-S. (R. 652-53, 1341; A. 194, 236-37)
However, M-S did not even claim that Stoof obtained the
funds by some nefarious design. During the trial, it expressly withdrew any claim that the funds were obtained
from it through fraud and that title thereto did not "pass"
from it.11 Furthermore, Stoof s intent in having the money
transferred has absolutely nothing to do with the question
of whose funds were being transferred. The Trial Court
expressly found that they belonged to Dai-Ron and the
record clearly supports this determination. For example,
there is ample evidence from which to infer that $25,000
of Dai-Ron's funds were available for transfer on March
15, 1971, independent of Stoofs $34,725.50 deposit to the
Dai-Ron account on that day. Exhibit 58-DC; (A. 215),
an M-S accounting record for Dai-Ron's account, shows
that on the morning of March 15,1971, Dai-Ron had $18,357.50 in its cash account with M-S. In addition, it would
" S e e statement of Mr. Meservy made at R. 1242; A. 133 quoted
above at page 14. Furthermore, if Stoof s intent were a material issue
it could not help M-S's claim against Zions. Stoof acted as M-S's agent
in directing Zions to release the funds (see discussion under Point
III, infra) and the consequences of any improper motive by Stoof
should be imposed upon it rather than Zions, an innocent party. As
the actor, M-S must bear the loss even if it were equally innocent
with Zions. 27 Am. Jur. 2d, Equity § 146.
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have had whatever surplus was reflected in its equity account.12 Although the record is silent as to balance in DalRon's equity account on March 15, 1971, if there was a
negative balance it was M-S's burden to prove it, which
it did not do. In the absence of such proof, and in view
of the Trial Court's express finding that the $25,000 were
Dai-Ron's funds, this Court is entitled (indeed, obligated)
to presume that Dai-Ron's equity and cash accounts at
least equaled $25,000 on that date.
Other evidence which may have confused the Trial
Court concerned oral testimony by Secrest and Schneider
that M-S suffered a net loss in the Dai-Ron Account as
a result of trading losses incurred in closing out the accounts of its Salt Lake office while Schneider was in Salt
Lake during the period of March 16-18, 1971. If the Trial
Court based its detecrmination that M-S was entitled to
recover the $25,000 upon this testimony it committed clear
error for at least two reasons.
First, although M-S had the burden of proving the
amount of its damage, neither Secrest, Schneider nor any
other witness offered any evidence (oral or otherwise) as
to the amount of trading losses allegedly incurred by M-S.
12

Priscilla Secrest explained that M-S maintained two accounting
records for each of its customers. One, a cash account, is illustrated by
Exhibit 58-DC, and represents the amount of cash of the customer on
hand and available for trading purposes on a given day. The second
account represents the customers equity position in its commodities
future contracts and is a function of his losses or gains in such contracts. (R. 1260-62; A. 138-41)
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The record is simply silent on this essential point. Indeed,
M-S failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that it suffered any losses, its only evidence being the bald
statements of Secrest and Schneider that losses occurred
without any supporting documentary or oral evidence concerning the specific trading transactions, amounts of loss,
etc. Northing in the record supports a damage award in
any amount. Certainly, nothing suggests that M-S's losses
even approached $25,000. The court cannot (but the Trial
Court in this case did) relieve M-S of its burden of proof
by awarding it damages for which no evidence exists.
Second, all of the trading losses claimed by M-S occurred (if they occurred at all) after March 15, 1971, and
cannot support M-S's claim that it suffered damage when
Zions disbursed to Clark Tank Lines the $25,000 transferred to Zions by M-S on that day. The record conclusively establishes that any trading losses claimed by M-S
were caused solely by frantic trading activity during
March 17-18, 1971, in Salt Lake City under Schneider's
personal, on-the-scene supervision, after it became apparent that Stoof had serious problems and would no longer
be working for M-S, Schneider and Secrest testified that
on March 16, 1971, many customers of M-S's Salt Lake
office had large positions in soybean contracts and that
the soybean market went against these positions on the
morning of March 17. (R. 870, 1225-27; A. 20, 126-27)
Because of this and Stoof's departure from the local office, Schneider came to Salt Lake and undertook an intensive two day effort to contact the customers of the
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Salt Lake office concerning their market positions.13
Schneider admitted that any losses existing in the DalRon account on March 18,1971, would have resulted from
these trading losses and not from allocating Salt Lake office expense to this account. (R. 913-14; A. 33-34) Because of the volatile nature of the commodities futures
market14 it is, perhaps, possible that losses occurred in
these accounts during this period. However, the record
doesn't indicate the amount of any such losses and, in any
event, they all occurred after March 15, 1971, when the
transaction upon which M-S's counterclaim was based was
entirely consummated and could not have been caused by
any act of Zions. Indeed, M-S's counsel admitted during
the Trial that evidence of losses in the Dai-Ron account
occurring after March 15,1971, were not relevant to M-S's
counterclaim.15
13

This effort was referred to by several witnesses. Secrest testified
that on March 17, 1971, Schneider was in Salt Lake "attempting to
contact the various customers . . . to ask them what to do with their
position." (R. 1228; A. 128) She said that when the soybean market
opened at 9:30 on that day, "one side went one way and the other
side went the other which was contrary to our position." (R. 1229;
A. 129) Betty Curtis and Dal Bagley also testified that they were
heavily involved under Schneider's direction in calling customers of
M-S's Salt Lake office about their positions on March 17 and 18,
1971. (R. 824-25, 830, 1042-45; A. 8-11, 49-50)
14
Secrest testified that market prices can fluctuate sharply in a
matter of seconds. (R. 1224; A. 126)
15

Following M-S's withdrawal of its claim that the funds were
obtained from it by fraud, the following colloquy occurred:
MR. MESERVY: If the Court please, it would appear to
me in view of my stipulation into the record at the commencement of this session the issues of losses in this account
would no longer be relevant since they were relevant to
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Finally, the Trial Court may simply have been
troubled because Stoof was using money which the Court
found belonged to Dai-Ron to pay his personal debt to
Clark. The Court repeatedly stressed that the $25,000 was
not Stoof's money. (R. 653, 1342-43; A. 196-96, 237) Apparently, it simply forgot that it wasn't M-S's money
either, even though M-S was the party seeking damages
for its "loss". Whether Dai-Ron had or has ground to
complain has never been an issue in this case. The Trial
Court's error in awarding M-S judgment on the counterclaim is clear even though its ratio decidendi is not.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTIONS FOR A NEW
TRIAL OR TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT AND IN CONCLUDING THAT ZIONS
WAS NEGLIGENT IN DISBURSING THE
$25,000 TO CLARK BECAUSE ZIONS FULLY
COMPLIED WITH THE INSTRUCTION
CONTAINED ON THE ADVICE OF CREDIT
the question of the fraud and the fraud count on our counterclaim. At the present time they would not be relevant
to our position in our claim back for the $25,000 from the
bank.
THE COURT: Well, it might have some bearing upon
whose money the $25,000 was, you see.
MR. MESERVY: Well, I don't believe that would be so,
Your Honor, because we are talking about a situation several days after the $25,000 was transferred out. (R. 1248;
A. 135)
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(EXHIBIT 54-DMS) IN DISBURSING THE
FUNDS.
Assuming, arguendo, that the notation on the Advice
of Credit was, as M-S contends, the only instruction given
to Zions in connection with the $25,000,16 and that M-S's
actual intention was for Dai-Ron to receive the funds,17
the evidence conclusively shows that Zions faithfully complied with such instruction.
An important fact apparently overlooked by the Trial
Court was that Stoof was at all times, including March
15, 1971, Dai-Ron's President, holding, on the date, draft
authority on Dai-Ron's checking account at South Davis
Security Bank. (R. 571, 649, 1086; Exh. 7-P, Exh. 24-P;
A. 58, 207, 209, 218, 233.) Zions' actions on March 15th
must be viewed in light of these facts.
First, in disturbing the funds to Dai-Ron, Zions could
only deal with that company's officers and employees.18
Disbursement of the funds to Dai-Ron's President, Stoof,
or at his discretion was, in fact, disbursement to Dai-Ron.
Secondly, the facts known to Zions when it disbursed the $25,000 upon Stoof's instructions were cer16

In fact, the instructions received by Zions included instructions
received from M-S's agents, Stoof and Curtis. See discussion under
Point III, infra.
17
In fact, M-S's actual intention was for Stoof to receive the funds.
See discussion upnder Point IV, infra.
18

A corporation can only act through its agents and employees.
Stratton v. West States Constr., 21 Utah 2d 60, 140 P.2d 117 (1968);
19 CJS Corporations § 999.
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tainly sufficient to clothe him, in Zions' eyes, with at
least the apparent authority to direct the distribution
of Dai-Ron's funds.19 Christensen testified that she knew
that Stoof, in addition to being the local representative
for M-S, was also connected with the Dal-Ron account.
(R. 653, 1203-04; A. 123, 237.) On the morning of March
15, 1971, Stoof had deposited into the Segregated Fund
Account at Zions a check for $34,725.50 drawn by him
as President of Dal-Ron on Dai-Ron's corporate account
at South Davis Security Bank. (R. 651, 1092; Exh. 7-P;
A. 60, 206, 235.) Thus, when Zions distributed the $25,000 it was holding physical evidence of Stoof's authority
to disburse Dai-Ron's corporate funds.
M-S has argued that Stoof was not authorized to
draw checks on the Dal-Ron account at South Davis
Security Bank without the co-signature of Dal Bagley,
since the account signature card purportedly required
both signatures. (Exh. 4-P; A. 204.) Zions, however,
was unaware of any such requirement and the Dal-Ron
check drawn and deposited with it by Stoof on March
15, 1971, contained nothing on its face to indicate that
two signatures were needed. In fact, there is only one
signature line on the printed check. Furthermore, the
record shows that in practice checks had been drawn on
the account by Stoof and Bagley individually, had been
19

Under the doctrine of apparent authority, a person who manifests to a third person that another is his "agent", is bound by the
actions of such "agent" regardless of the latter's actual authority.
Restatement, Agency 2d § 8.
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honored by the drawee bank, and that the parties didn't
"worry" about having two signatures on the checks. (R.
1093; A. 61.) Regardless of the number of signatures
required, however, it is unconfaoverted that Stoof was
an actual signatory on Dal-Ron's checking account and
he proclaimed such authority to Zions on March 15, 1971,
by depositing with it the Dai-Ron check drawn by him
on that date.
In holding Zions negligent, the Trial Court placed
great emphasis upon the fact that the funds were disbursed in the form of a check payable to Clearfield State
Bank, rather than to Dai-Ron. Indeed, in the Trial
Court's view, this fact was determinative on the question
of Zions' negligence. The Trial Court stated:
And certainly the bank employee that signed
the cashier's check had some responsibility in
failing to see that that check was made out to
Dai-Ron Enterprises. But it seems to me that
the bank had an aboslute duty in disbusing funds
to do so by check made payable to Dai-Ron
Enterprises and to no one else. (R. 1342; A.
195.)
[R]elease of those funds payable other than to
Dai-Ron Enterprises . . . constituted negligence
on the part of the bank. (R. 658; A. 242.)
Perhaps the Trial Court was troubled by the fact that
by having the check made payable to Clearfield State
Bank, rather than to Dai-Ron, Zions may have facilitated
Stoof's personal use of the funds to partially pay his
existing indebtedness to Clark Tank lines.
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It should first be noted that the instruction on the
Advice of Credit only directed Zions to "credit" the funds
to Dal-Ron; it did not preclude Zions from thereafter
disbursing them as directed by Dal-Ron. Presumably,
the receipt of the funds was properly reflected by Zions
as a credit to Dai-Ron's account when the funds were
received and with a corresponding debit entry when they
were disbursed. The record is silent on this point but it
was M-S's burden to prove non-compliance with the instruction.
Appellant does not claim that as Dai-Ron's President,
Stoof had inherent authority to pay his personal obligations with corporate funds. Appellant simply contends
that Stoof's use of the funds is immaterial to M-S's right
to recover against Zions in this case. At best, Stoof's
use of the funds could only give rise to a claim by DalRon for their return, a claim not made in this action or
elsewhere.20 No party herein claims to be an assignee of
or subrogated to Dai-Ron's claim.
Furthermore, the manner in which Zions disbursed
the funds, by a check payable to Clearfield State Bank,
did less to facilitate Stoof's personal use of the funds
than if it had made the check payable to Dal-Ron. As
Dai-Ron's President, Stoof could easily have endorsed
20

Dal-Ron did not complain, counterclaim or crossclaim against
any party in this action. Bagley testified that he had never made
any legal claim to the $25,000. (R. 1036; A. 47) Stoof said that Bagley had never made any claim to him for the $25,000. (R. 1126, A. 84)
By such failure to assert a claim Dal-Ron has either ratified Stoof's
use of the funds or is estopped from now asserting any right to the
funds. Gordan v. Pettingill, 105 Colo. 214, 96 P.2d 416 (1939).
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the check and used the funds for his own purpose. Indeed, as President, he possessed the implied or inherent
power, by virtue of his office, to endorse commercial
paper on behalf of the corporation. 2 Fletchers, Corporations § 601. Furthermore, any bank negotiating a DalRon check endorsed by him as a fiduciary of Dai-Ron
would be protected from liability even if he used the
funds for his own purpose unless the bank had actual
knowledge of such use or otherwise paid the check in
bad faith.21 A check payable to Clearfield State Bank,
however, was beyond Stoof's fiduciary endorsement
power. It could only be transferred to Clark by proper
endorsement by Clearfield State Bank. This, in fact, was
done, and Clearfield has never made any claim to the
check or the proceeds thereof.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTIONS FOR A NEW
TRIAL OR TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT AND IN CONCLUDING THAT ZIONS
WAS NEGLIGENT IN DISBURSING THE
$25,000 TO CLARK BECAUSE THE "INSTRUCTIONS" RECEIVED BY Z I O N S
FROM M-S CONCERNING SUCH DISBURSEMENT INCLUDED ALL INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED FROM THE AGENTS
AND EMPLOYEES OF M-S'S SALT LAKE
2i § 22-1-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
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OFFICE, WHICH INSTRUCTIONS WERE
FULLY COMPLIED WITH BY ZIONS.
In claiming that Zions failed to follow its instructions in disbursing the $25y000, M-S relied solely upon
the notation "For credit of Dai-Ron Enterprises" as set
forth in the "Advice of Credit" received by Zions from
Harris Trust in connection with the transfer. (Exh. 54DMS; A. 214.) Both M-S and the Trial Court failed
to recognize that the "instructions" received by Zions
concerning the disbursement of the funds included not
only this notation, but also the specific, direct instructions given it by Stoof and Betty Curtis, both agents
or employees of M-S at its Salt Lake office.
The specific instructions given to Karen Christensen
(Zions' wire transfer desk clerk) by Stoof were to disburse the funds in the form of a cashier's check payable
to Clearfield State Bank and to deliver said check to
Craig Maddux. (R. 653, 1125, 1137-38, 1156, 1196; A.
83-84, 93-94, 96, 115, 237.) These same instructions were
repeated to Christensen by Betty Curtis, a secretary and
bookkeeper at M-S's local office. (R. 1125, 1279-80; A.
83„ 148.) Zions fully complied with the instructions received from Stoof and Curtis in disbursing the funds,
M-S can't point only to the instruction which came
to Zions from Harris Trust and ignore or disclaim responsibility for more explicit instructions given to Zions
by its local agents. This is particularly so where the
instructions were given by Stoof, whom M-S had appointed as the manager of its local office.
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The powers of an agent are particularly
broad in the case of one acting as general agent
or manager; such a position presupposes a degree of confidence reposed and investiture with
liberal powers for the exercise of judgment and
discretion in transactions and concerns which
are incidental or appurtenant to the business
entrusted to his care and management. 3 Am.
Jur. 2d, Agency §86.
Christensen testified that she accepted and followed
Stoof's instructions because she had met him previously
and knew he was M-S's representative for its Salt Lake
office. She also said she knew he was connected with
the Dai-Ron account. (R. 653,1196, 1203-04; A. 115, 12223, 237.) Stoof was, as admitted by Schneider, specifically
authorized to request transfers of customers' funds from
Chicago to Zions in Salt Lake. (R. 909; A. 34.)
Furthermore, the instructions received by Zions from
the local M-S agents were given repeatedly on the day
of the transaction. Betty Curtis testified that she spoke
by telephone with Karen Christensen several times on
that day concerning the transfer, during which conversations she told her to make the check payable to Clearfield State Bank and that Maddux would pick it up. (R.
1279-82; A. 14S-51.) In addition, Stoof spoke with Christensen at least twice, giving her the same instructions.
(R. 1124,1281; A. 83,149.) Zions was literally bombarded
with instructions from M-S's local agents concerning the
distribution of the funds.
The instructions were and are binding upon M-S,
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who knowingly caused and permitted Stoof and Curtis
to be its agents and to appear as such to Zions, who responded to their directions in good faith. Under such
circumstances, M-S is responsible for their acts even
though they may have been acting fraudulently, for their
own account and not in M-S's interest. Restatement,
Agency §§261 and 262; 3 C. J. S. Agency §257.
It is, however, for the ultimate interest of persons employing agents, as well as for the benefit of the public, that persons dealing with agents
should be able to rely upon apparently true
statements by agents who are purporting to
act and are apparently acting in the interests
of the principal. Restatement, Agency 2d §262,
Comment a.
The Trial Court's judgment unjustly rewards M-S and
penalizes Zions for faithfully and fully complying with
the instructions of M-S's agents.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S M O T I O N S FOR A NEW
TRIAL OR TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT AND IN CONCLUDING THAT
ZIONS WAS NEGLIGENT IN DISBURSING
THE $25,000 BECAUSE M-S INTENDED
THAT THE FUNDS BE DISBURSED TO
STOOF, DID NOT INTEND ZIONS TO BE
INSTRUCTED OTHERWISE, AND ZIONS
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PROPERLY FOLLOWED M-S"S INTENDED
INSTRUCTIONS.
Not only did the trial court fail to consider the entire instructions given to Zions by M-S and its local
agents, it also failed to recognize that the notation on
the Advice of Credit was not the "imtruction" intended
by M-S concerning the funds. The evidence clearly
shows that (1) M-S did not intend the notation on the
Advice of Credit to be an instruction to Zions, (2) M-S
intentionally transferred the funds to Stoof, for his own
personal use, (3) M-S intended the funds to be picked
up, rather than "credited" to Dai-Ron's account as stated
in the notation, and (4) Zions fully complied with M-S's
intent in disbursing the funds.
Schneider admitted that the notation on the Advice
of Credit (Exhibit 54-DMS) was not a directive to the
bank to do any particular thing with the funds, but was
merely a bookkeeping memorandum for M-S. (R. 1329;
A. 187-88.) He further stated that he sent the funds
only as an "accommodation" to Stoof, for him to use
to buy Dal Bagley's interest in Dai-Ron. (R. 854, 1325;
A. 14, 184.) When asked what he intended Zions to do
with the funds he stated that it was to hold them for
"pick up" by Dal~Ron. (R. 1328; A. 187.)
These admissions show that the true intention was
for Stoof, not Dai-Ron, to get the funds. The issue of
Stoof's authority to use the Dai-Ron money is immaterial
to the issue of Zions' liability for failure to follow the
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alleged "instmctions". Assuming he was not, that could
only give rise to a claim by Dai-Ron never made in this
action or elsewhere. It is clear from the evidence that
M-S when faced with Zions' claim on the overdrawn account, seized upon the notation on the Advice of Credit
as a basis for asserting its counterclaim, notwithstanding that at the time of the transaction its intention was
to get the funds to Stoof rather than to Dai-Ron. Zions
fully complied with the intended instruction by disbursing the funds according to Stoof's directions,
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTIONS FOR A NEW
TRIAL OR TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT AND IN AWARDING JUDGMENT
TO M-S BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE SHOWS
THAT M-S'S DAMAGES, IF ANY, WERE
PROXIMATELY CAUSED BY ITS OWN
AGENTS.
Appellant submits that M-S failed to prove by sufficient evidence that any damage suffered by it was proximately caused by Zions and that the evidence clearly
shows that any such damages were caused by M-S's
agents and employees, Stoof and Curtis, by the direct
statements made by them to Zions (as recited under
Point III, supra) concerning the manner in which the
funds were to be disbursed. These statements were the
independent inteivening proximate cause of any loss suf-
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fered by M-S and it cannot recover from Zions therefor.
McMurdie v. Underwood, 9 Utah 2d 400, 346 P. 2d 711
(1959); HiUyard v. Utah By-Products Co., 1 Utah 2d
143, 263 P. 2d 287 (1953).
POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT IMPOSED AN IMPROPER STANDARD OF CARE UPON
ZIONS IN HOLDING THAT IT WAS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE IN DISBURSING
THE $25,000.
Appellant submits that the Trial Court erred by
imposing an improper standard of care upon Zions in
holding that it was liable for negligence in disbursing
the funds.
Utah has adopted the Uniform Fiduciaries Act
(§ §22-1-1, et seq., U. C. A., 1953, as amended, the "Act"),
the purpose of which is to establish uniform and definite
rules to govern the liability of banks and others who deal
with fiduciaries. Under the statute, banks are not liable
for negligence, which is the only basis upon which the
Trial Court imposed liability upon Zions in this action.
The general purpose of the Act is to establish uniform and definite rules in place of the
divers and indefinite rules now prevailing as to
"constructive notice" of breaches of fiduciary
obligations. In some cases there should be no
liability in the absence of actual knowledge or
bad faith; in others there should be action at
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peril. In none of the situations here treated is
the standard of due care or negligence made
the test. (Commissioners' Note to §1 of the Act,
quoted in II Paton's Digest §22A: 1.) [Emphasis
supplied.]
For the purposes of the Act, a "fiduciary" includes
an "agent", an "officer of a corporation" or "any other
person acting in a fiduciary capacity for any person".
§22-1-1, U. C. A., 1953. On March 15, 1971, Stoof was
an agent of M-S and President of Dai-Ron.
Section 2 of the Act (§22-1-2, U. C. A., 1953) provides as follows:
A person who in good faith pays or transfers to
a fiduciary any money or other property which
the fiduciary as such is authorized to receive,
is not responsible for the proper application
thereof by the fiduciary; and no right or title
acquired from the fiduciary in consideration of
such payment or transfer is invalid in consequence of a misappUcation by the fiduciary.
Under this statute, Zions is "not responsible" for the
application of any money paid to Stoof in good faith if
Stoof was "authorized to receive" such money. Stoof was
unquestionably authorized by both Dai-Ron and M-S to
receive the $25,000 from the bank. He was President
of Dai-Ron, the owner of the funds, having authority to
draw checks on its account at South Davis Security Bank.
He was the local office manager of M-S, the person responsible for maintaining the Segregated Fund Account
and upon whose "instructions" Zions acted in connection
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with the transaction. It was clearly Schneider's intent
that Stoof receive the money and the Trial Court found
that he sent the funds to Stoof for the purpose of buying
out Bagley's interest in Dal-Ron. Stoofs actual use of
the funds is wholly immaterial to the issues of Zions' liability under the statute. Under the Act, the bank is "not
responsible" for the bad faith of the fiduciary so long
as the bank itself acts in good faith. The whole purpose
of the Act is to protect banks and other persons dealing
with fiduciaries from incurring liability for the fiduciary's
breach of trust unless the bank has actual knowledge of
such breach or otherwise acts in bad faith. The record
does not suggest, nor did the Trial Court find, that Zions
had any indication of Stoof's intended use of the money
or that it acted in bad faith.
Furthermore, even if Utah did not have the Uniform
Fiduciaries Act, Zions' non-liability for mere negligence
is established under principles of general common law.
It is well recognized that under Utah law at the time
the causes of action in this case arose,22 a plaintiff's contributory ordinary negligence barred recovery for damages caused by the ordinary negligence of the defendant.
E. g. Rogers v. Rio Grande Western R. Co., 32 Utah 367,
90 Pac. 1075 (1907).23 A fortiori, where the plaintiff has
"Utah's comparative negligence law did not become effective
until May 8, 1973. Laws of Utah, 1973, Ch. 209.
23
This principle is applicable in an agency relationship. An agent's
contributory negligence bars or does not bar his principal from recovery against a third party to the same extent as the principal's own
contributory negligence. Restatement, Agency 2d § 317.
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acted intentionally, in bad faith* or has been grossly or
wantonly negligent or reckless, he cannot recover from
a defendant whose conduct amounts only to ordinary
negligence.
As previously stated (see Point III), in disbursing
the funds, Zions responded to the directions of M-S's
local agents and employees, including its local manager.
The only inference to be drawn from the evidence is that
Stoof and Curtis acted intentionally in giving these instructions to Zions, for the purpose of causing the funds
to be disbursed in the manner prescribed by them. They
were not simply negligent in giving such instructions but
acted intentionally, for a specific purpose. As principal,
M-S placed them in the position to so act and was responsible for regualting and supervising their conduct. Restatement, Agency 2d §213. Under such circumstances,
Zions can only be liable for complying with the intentional instructions of the M-S agents if it acted with
knowledge that the disbursement was improper or in bad
faith or under circumstances amounting to gross or wanton negligence, none of which were found by the Trial
Court. The Trial Court's determination that Zions was
ordinarily negligent is an insufficient legal basis upon
which to impose liability and the judgment against it on
the counterclaim must therefore be reversed. !
B.

Appeal from Judgment of the Trial Court
Awardiing Zions Judgment on its Third Party Complaint Against Clark Tank Lines.
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POINT VII.
REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S
JUDGMENT AWARDING M-S JUDGMENT
ON ITS COUNTERCLAIM WILL REQUIRE
REVERSAL OF ZIONS THIRD PARTY
JUDGMENT AGAINST C L A R K T A N K
ONES.
Under Rule 14, Utah Rules of Cvil Procedure, Zions'
cause of action on its Third Party Complaint against
Clark can arise only upon Zions' first being held liable
to M-S on the latter's counterclaim. The prayer for relief in Zions' Third Party Complaint is based upon the
fulfillment of this condition precedent. (R. 182-83.)
Therefore, reversal of the judgment in favor of M-S on
its counterclaim will automatically require reversal of
the Third Party judgment without need for any consideration of the merits of that action.
POINT VIII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTIONS FOR A NEW
TRIAL OR TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT AND IN AWARDING JUDGMENT IN
FAVOR OF ZIONS ON THE THIRD ARTY
COMPLAINT BECAUSE SUCH JUDGMENT
IS UNSUPPORTED BY ANY FINDING OF
ACTIONABLE WRONG COMMITTED BY
CLARK VIA-A-VIS ZIONS, B E C A U S E
CLARK COMMITTED NO SUCH ACTION-
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ABLE WRONG AND WAS NOT UNJUSTLY
ENRICHED BY RECEIVING THE FUNDS.
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the
Trial Court made the following factual findings in support of its conclusion that Clark was liable to Zions on
the Third P&rty Complaint:
42. The said $25,000 was deposited by
Craig Maddux into the aocount of Clark Tank
Lines, and helped Mr. Maddux achieve a partial
return to Clark Tank Lines of $50,000 which
Stoof had obtained from Maddux, drawn on the
Clark Tank Lines account a few days before.
43. Clark Tank Lines received the $25,000
in question and used the funds for its own purposes, although officials of Clark Tank Lines,
other than Stoof and Maddux had no knowledge
of the transaction prior thereto.
44. J. Moroni Stoof and Craig Maddux
were acting together on behalf of Clark Tank
Lines in obtaining the said $25,000 from Zions
First National Bank as aforesaid.
45. Third Party Defendant, Clark Tank
Lines, benefitted by reason thereof to the extent
of $25,000 which it neither earned nor deserved.
(R. 658; A. 242.)
In entering these findings, the court considered and
rejected the following proposed findings prepared by counsel for Zions, modifying them as set forth in the foregoingParagraphs 44 and 45.
44. J. Moroni Stoof and Craig Maddux
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were acting together on behalf of Clark Tank
Lines, and obtained the said $25,000 from Zions
First National Bank by deceit, trickery and/or
misrepresentation.
45. Third Party Defendant, Clark Tank
Lines, benefitted by Stoof's fraud to the extent
of $25,000, which it neither earned nor deserved.
(R. 698; A. 229.)
Thus, the Trial Court expressly refused to find that
Clark obtained the funds from Zions by "deceit, trickery
and/or misrepresentation" or by reason of "fraud" on the
part of Stoof. Indeed, the court didn't find that Clark's
actions were in any way wrongful.
Appellant submits that the Trial Court's findings
show that Clark committed no actionable wrong upon
which to base liability to Zions on the Third Party Complaint, that the record contains no sufficient evidence upon which to base such liability and that the evidence is
contrary to a determination of such liability.
The only evidence which in any way connects Clark
to the release of the funds by Zions is that Stoof and
Maddux were Clark's employees on March 15,1971. With
respect to Stoof, however, it is clear that in directing
Zions to make the cashier's check payable to Clearfield
and to give it to Maddux, he was acting as M-S's agent
and/or as Dai-Ron's President, and not as Clark's employee. Christensen testified that she complied with
Stoof's instruction because she knew he was M-S's local
representative and was connected with the Dai-Ron account. Nothing in the record suggests that she had any
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knowledge that he was employed by Clark. Stoof was
successful in obtaining the release of the funds because
he was M-S's agent and Dai-Ron's President, not because
of his part-time employment at Clark. If Stoof acted
wrongfully in causing Zions to disburse the funds, that
wrong is attributable only to M-S or Dai-Ron, and not
to Clark.
Maddux's position is somewhat different since he was
employed only by Clark on March 15, 1971, and was not
associated with M-S or Dai-Ron. Maddux, however, did
nothing wrongful in connection with the transaction. All
he did was to receive the funds in partial payment of a
bona fide obligation owed to Clark by Stoof. The Trial
Court's only finding was that he and Stoof were "acting
together" in obtaining the funds. Concerted action is not,
however, inherently wrongful and the Trial Court expressly found that neither his nor Stoof's actions were
deceitful or constituted trickery, misrepresentation or
fraud.
The Trial Court's statement in Paragraph 45 that
Clark neither "earned nor deserved" the $25,000 is directly contrary to the evidence and the Court's further
finding in Paragraph 42 is that the funds were a "partial
return to Clark Tank lines of $50,000 which Stoof had
obtained from Maddux, drawn on the Clark Tank Lines
account "a few days before," (R. 658; A. 242.) The
evidence is uncontroverted that the money was a payment of a bona fide debt owed by Stoof to Clark. The
Trial Court's finding was perhaps motivated by its re-
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luctance to allow Clark to receive Dai-Ron's money in
satisfaction of Stoof s personal debt. The question of
Stoof s authority to use these funds in this way is not,
however ,material to the issue of Clark's liability on the
Third Party Complaint. Clark "deserved" to have Stoof s
debt repaid and was not unjustly enriched by receiving
the funds. Whether it had a right to repayment out of
Dai-Ron's funds is a question that could only be raised
by Dal-Ron or someone standing in Dai-Ron's shoes as
its assignee or subrogee, positions not occupied by Zions.
CONCLUSION
Appellant submits that the Trial Court's judgment
in favor of M-S on its counterclaim is erroneous on any
of the numerous grounds above set forth. The judgment
awards M-S damages for the "loss" of funds which the
Trial Court expressly found belonged to Dal-Ron and for
a "loss" which in any event was caused by M-S's own
agents. The Trial Court totally failed to recognize that
M-S's own agents, Stoof and Curtis, instructed Zions
concerning the distribution of the funds and the evidence
clearly shows that Zions followed these instructions, the
instruction received from Harris Trust and the instructions actually intended by M-S. The Court also imposed
an erroneous standard of care in holding Zions liable for
ordinary negligence.
Appellant further submits that the Third Party judgment in favor of Zions is unsupported by the evidence
and the Trial Court's findings and is contrary to the evi-
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dence and law. Furthermore, it must be reversed if the
judgment on M-S's counterclaim is for any reason reversed.
Appellant respectfully asks this Court to reverse the
portions of the Judgment of the Trial Court herein appealed from and for its costs on appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
RONALD J. OCKEY, of
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook
& McDonough
800 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
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